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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines unionism’s relationship to the size of the middle class and its 
relationship to intergenerational mobility. Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) 1985 
and 2011 files are used to examine the change in the share of workers in a middle-income 
group (defined by persons having incomes within 50 percent of the median) and use a 
shift-share decomposition to explore how the decline of unionism contributes to the 
shrinking middle class. The files are also used to investigate the correlation between 
parents’ union status and the incomes of their children. Additionally, federal income tax 
data is used to examine the geographical correlation between union density and 
intergenerational mobility. Findings include that union workers are disproportionately in 
the middle-income group or above, and some reach middle-income status due to the 
union wage premium; the offspring of union parents have higher incomes than the 
offspring of otherwise comparable non-union parents, especially when the parents are 
low-skilled; and offspring from communities with higher union density have higher 
average incomes relative to their parents compared to offspring from communities with 
lower union density. These findings show a strong, though not necessarily causal, link 
between unions, the middle class, and intergenerational mobility. 
 
 
JEL code: J31, J51, J62 
                                                          
1
 The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not represent an endorsement by the 
Federal Reserve System. 
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This paper addresses three ways in which unionism potentially affects workers that the 
voluminous quantitative literature on “what do unions do” has largely ignored.  
 
The first way relates to the impact of unionism on the size of the middle class. Since 
unions tend to compress the structure of wages and incomes, and the middle class consists 
of persons near the middle of the income distribution, it could be expected that union 
workers would be primarily in the middle-income group and that a decline in union 
density would contribute to the shrinking middle class size. This issue has not been widely 
explored because the shrinking American middle class is a recent phenomenon. Most 
studies of unions and the distribution of wages and salaries use metrics like the Gini 
coefficient or the variance of the log of earnings rather than the proportion of workers in 
the middle of the distribution. The first section of this paper shows that union workers are 
indeed disproportionately middle class or higher, with some attaining middle-class 
incomes as a result of the union wage premium, and that the decline of unionism 
contributes to the shrinking middle class. 
 
The second previously unexplored way in which unions could affect workers is through 
the intergenerational transmission of economic status. The second section of this paper 
shows that having a union parent is associated with improved outcomes for children after 
controlling for parents’ education, race, occupation, industry, and other covariates. This 
could be in part due to the union wage premium raising parental income, in part due to 
better education and health outcomes associated with having a unionized parent 
independent of parental income, and in part due to the intergenerational transmission of 
union status.   
 
The third issue examined is whether the union density of the area in which a young person 
grows up is associated with their future economic performance. If parental unionization 
raises the upward mobility of offspring, children from areas with higher union density 
ought to do better than children from areas with lower union density. To the extent that 
unions press for better schooling and social amenities in an area, the union impact should 
spill over from union to non-union families, producing a residence-based impact beyond 
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the union status of individuals. It could also serve as verification that any potential 
positive effects of unions on children do not reflect a redistribution of opportunity from 
non-union to union children. The third section of this paper finds that, regardless of the 
union status of their parents, offspring from communities with higher union density have 
higher average incomes relative to their parents than offspring from communities with 
lower union density. 
 
While these findings are not necessarily causal, the relationship between unionism, the 
middle class, and inequality found in this and other studies raises the question of whether 
the United States will be able to reduce income equality and rebuild a strong middle class 
absent a vibrant trade union movement or other comparable institutions for workers. 
 
 	
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		
 
Following Krueger’s (2012) analysis with the Center for Economics Policy Research’s 
Current Population Survey (CPS) of March, middle class is defined as the population aged 
25–64 earning an income between 0.5 and 1.5 times the median income level—the portion 
of the population within 50 percent of the median income. Figure 1 shows that the size of 
the middle class has fallen by more than 10 percentage points from 56.5 percent in 1979 to 
45.1 percent in 2012. During the same period, the unionization of American workers 
declined by 13 percentage points, from 24 percent to 11 percent.2 
 
Figure 1: Shrinking middle-income group 
                                                          
2
 See Hirsch and Macpherson 2003 for all wage and salary workers; Union Membership and Coverage 
Database from the CPS, www.unionstats.com. 
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Note: Income measure includes both earned and unearned income. The source is the CPS March data 
extracts produced by the Center for Economics Policy Research. Available at http://ceprdata.org/cps-
uniform-data-extracts/march-cps-supplement/march-cps-data.  
 
The Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), which contains information on the incomes 
and union status of parents and of their adult offspring, is used to examine the relationship 
between unionism and middle-class status among parents and offspring. It displays a 
similar decline in the middle-income group to that in the CPS. 
 
Table 1: The proportion of unionized and proportion of workers by position in the 
income distribution for parents and offspring, by union status 
 
 All Unionized Non-unionized 
 Parents Offspring Parents Offspring Parents Offspring 
 1985 2011 1985 2011 1985 2011 
       
Proportion unionized 19.07% 10.90% 100% 100% 0% 0% 
       
Income distribution       
Upper income group 31.61% 33.03% 31.74% 36.67% 31.58% 32.58% 
Middle income group 54.04% 46.01% 63.50% 53.17% 51.82% 45.13% 
Lower income group 14.35% 20.96% 4.77% 10.17% 16.60% 22.29% 
       
Note: Median income is the median of household income for working-age (ages 25-64) heads of household. The 
1985 sample represents parents while the 2011 sample represents their children. The middle-income group is 
heads of household aged 25–64 whose family incomes fall between 0.5 and 1.5 times the median family 
income. The upper income group is heads of household aged 25–64 whose family incomes are greater than 1.5 
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times the median family income. The lower income group is heads of household aged 25–64 who earn an 
income less than 0.5 times the median family income. Data sources are the PSID 1985 and 2011 files. 
 
Table 1 summarizes the pattern of unionization and the proportion of workers in the 
middle-income group for parents and their children in the Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics (PSID) data set. The status of parents in 1985 is contrasted with  the status of 
their adult offspring in 2011. If heads of household aged 25 to 64 have a family income 
between 50 percent and 150 percent of the median income, they are categorized as middle 
class and referred to as the “middle-income group.” The table also shows a drop in 
unionization of 8 percentage points (19.07 percent–10.90 percent) from parents to their 
offspring and a drop in the proportion of workers in the middle-income group by 8 
percentage points (54.04 percent–46.01 percent) between parents and their adult children. 
 
Are these changes connected? One way to estimate the contribution of the drop in 
unionization to the drop in the proportion of persons in the middle-income group is 
through a shift-share decomposition that divides the change in the middle-income group 
into two parts  
• the change in union density, and  
• the change in the proportion of union workers who were in the middle-income 
group relative to the proportion of non-union workers in that group.  
Let MCU and MCN be the share of union and non-union workers who are in the middle-
income group respectively, and let U be the union share of the workforce. Then, if MC 
(middle class) is the share of the workforce in the middle-income group, the following 
identity applies: 
 
(1) MC = (1−U)MCN +UMCU = MCN + (MCU − MCN )U  
 
The statistics in table 1 show that among parents in 1985 the share of union workers in the 
middle-income group was 12 percentage points larger than the share of non-union workers 
in the middle-income group (63.50 percent – 51.82 percent). Given the 19 percent of 
parents who were union in 1985, unionization contributed 2 percentage points (0.12 x 
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0.19) to the overall proportion of workers in the middle-income group among 1985 
parents. The effect of unionism on the income distribution of non-union workers through 
labor market spillovers or through union influence on public policies favorable for 
workers could produce a larger or smaller impact.3 
 
Taking changes of equation (1) over time, the change in the share of the workforce that is 
middle-income group can be decomposed as following: 
 
(2) ∆MC = ∆MCN + ∆(MCU − MCN )U + (MCU − MCN )∆U + ∆(MCU − MCN )∆U  
 
The first term, ∆MCN  , measures how the change in the proportion of non-union parents 
and non-union children in the middle-income group affects the overall change in the size 
of the middle-income group: this is –7 percentage points (=45.13 percent–51.82 percent). 
The second term, ∆(MCU − MCN )U  , measures the change in the share of union workers 
compared to the share of non-union workers in the middle-income group, multiplied by 
the 19 percent parents’ unionization rate. The statistics from table 1 show a 4 percentage 
point drop4 in the difference in the share of union and non-union workers in the middle-
income group among parents compared to offspring. To the extent that this reflects 
weakening unionism over time, it contributes about 0.008 percentage points (= –0.04 x 
0.19) to the fall in the size of the middle-income group.  
 
The third term, (MCU − MCN )∆U , is the standard shift component in a shift-share 
decomposition. It measures the impact of the 8 percentage-point drop in union density 
between 1985 and 2011 on the proportion of the workforce in the middle-income group, 
                                                          
3
 It will be larger if union wages and benefits spill over to non-union firms who mimic them to avoid union 
drives or if unions successfully lobby legislatures for laws favorable to all workers (the “threat” effect). It 
will be smaller if union wages and benefits reduce employment in the union sector, which increases the 
labor supply and reduces wages in non-union work (the “crowding” effect). Evidence suggests that the threat 
effect dominates the crowding effect and that unions raise wages for non-union workers (Farber 2005; 
Neumark and Wachter 1995). 
4
 The difference in the share of union and non-union parents in the middle-income group is 11 percentage 
points (=63.50%–51.82%) and the difference in the share of union and non-union offspring in the middle-
income group is 7 percentage points (=53.17%–45.13%). This results in a 4 (=7-11) percentage-point drop 
from parents to offspring in terms of the gap between union and non-union proportion in the middle class.  
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given the difference in the share of union and non-union parents in the middle-income 
group in 1985 (12 percentage points). It contributes about 1 percentage point (= - 0.08 x 
0.12) to the fall in the overall size of the middle-income group. The final term, 
∆(MCU − MCN )∆U , is the interaction between the change in the share of union and non-
union workers in the middle-income group and the change in union density. It adds about 
0.3 percentage points (= - 0.04 x- 0.08) to the middle-income group share of the work 
force. 
  
In sum, the “pure shift effect” of the decline in unionism contributes about 12 percent (= 
0.010/0.08) to the 8 percentage-point drop in the share of the middle-income group of 
workers. If the weakening in unions’ ability to boost workers into the middle-income 
group is attributed to the fall in union density, the decline of unionism contributes an 
additional 0.7 percentage points to the drop, thus accounting for almost 20 percent (= 
(0.007+ 0.010)/0.08) to the decline of the middle-income group. If the wage distribution of 
union and non-union workers was assumed to be stable between 1985 and 2011, and union 
density remained at its 1985 level, the size of the middle-income group in 2011 would 
have been higher by 1.4 percentage points (17 percent of 8 percentage points).  
 
As noted above, the reason union workers are disproportionately in the middle-income 
group is that collective bargaining tends to compress the distribution of wages for covered 
workers so that union workers have a narrower distribution than non-union workers 
(Western and Rosenfeld 2011; Card, Lemieux and Riddell 2004; Pontusson, Rueda, and 
Way 2002; DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux 1996; Freeman 1980, 1991, 1992; Card 1992). 
Figure 2 shows this phenomenon separately for parents in 1985 and for their offspring in 
2011. For both parents and offspring, the income distribution of union workers is more 
concentrated towards the center compared to that of non-union workers. The income 
distribution of offspring, however, is more dispersed than the income distribution of their 
parents, which reflects the higher income inequality in 2011 than in 1985.  
 
Figure 2: Income distribution for union workers and non-union workers 
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Note: The income distribution is constructed from the labor income of working-age (ages 25–64) samples. 
Data sources are the PSID 1985 and 2011 files.  
 
From this perspective, the statistics from table 1 on the fraction of people making less than 
50 percent of median income deserves particular attention. The fraction of people who 
belong to this lower income group increased from 14 percent among parents in 1985 to 21 
percent among offspring in 2011. The decline in unionization might have contributed to 
the fraction of young workers who did not make it to the middle-income group. If 
equation (2) is modified to assess the effect of the fall in unionism on the higher share of 
offspring than of parents in the lower income group,  the decline in the union density 
between parents and offspring can be estimated to contribute about 1 percentage point5 to 
the 7 percentage-point greater share of offspring than their parents in the lower income 
group, or 14 percent. 
 
In sum, however the data is organized, the decline of unionism appears to have 
contributed to the shrinkage of the middle-income group of the workforce and the 
increasing proportion of the lower income group, with a noticeable but not huge 
magnitude commensurate with unions’ declining role in the U.S. labor market. To the 
extent that the decline of unions impairs the wages of non-union workers, as Western and 
Rosenfeld (2011) argue, this is a conservative estimate of the impact of falling unionism 
on the middle class. 
 
                                                          
5
 The 0.01 percentage-point estimate is obtained by multiplying the different shares of union and non-union 
parents in the low-income group (16.6%–4.77%) by the 8 percentage-point difference in union density 
between 1985 and 2011. 
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The PSID provides details on the characteristics of families, including the labor income 
and union status of the household head and of the head’s wife,6 and of their adult offspring 
20–30 years later. To obtain a sample of parents and their adult offspring, the 1985 and 
2011 PSID files are matched by individual and a new file, limited to individuals who were 
children or stepchildren of the head of a household in 1985 and were heads of household 
or the wives of household heads in 2011, is created. The offspring sample is restricted to 
be younger than 38 years old in 2011 (younger than 12 years old in 1985) so that they are 
young enough to be influenced by parents’ economic status.  
 
A new set of 2011 “offspring” variables is created to characterize this group—
characteristics of the household heads if the individual was the head of household and 
characteristics of the wives if the individual was the married or unmarried partner of the 
male household head. These offspring variables are designed to focus on the relationships 
between parents and their children rather than between parents and the spouses of their 
children.7 Appendix B gives the summary statistics of the main PSID variables in this 
analysis. 
 
Table 2: Average labor income of offspring by parents’ union & education status  
 
 
Parents Parents without 
college degree 
Parents with 
college degree 
Offspring of 
union parents 
Labor income, 
(full-time) $48,000 $45,600 $53,300 
Highest grades 
completed 14.74 14.39 15.52 
Health 
(1-5, 5=excellent) 3.85 3.75 4.07 
Offspring of Labor income $45,700 $39,300 $53,800 
                                                          
6
 The PSID defines head of household as someone over age 16 with the most financial responsibility, but if 
that person is female and married to a man, then he is the head and she is the wife. Therefore, a woman is 
only the head of household if the household has no adult male who is not incapacitated. The wife also does 
not necessarily need to be legally married to the household head to be considered a wife in the PSID.  
7
 Because the analysis is limited to heads of household and wives, the data exclude children who were not 
heads of household or wives, consisting primarily of those living with their parents in 2011. 
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non-union 
parents 
(full-time) 
highest grades 
completed 14.67 13.78 15.78 
health 
(1-5, 5=excellent) 3.88 3.78 4.02 
Note: Difference between union and non-union college graduate parents is not statistically significant 
Calculations are for 26- to 37-year-olds who work full time and who had at least one parent who worked full 
time in 1985. Data sources are the PSID 1985 and 2011 files. Offspring are in the “union parents” group if 
they have at least one union parent, and in the “parents with college degree” group if they have at least one 
college-grad parent. 
 
To provide a first look at the relation between parents’ union status and their children’s 
income, the labor incomes of full-time offspring is compared by the union status of their 
parents. Table 2 presents the simple tabulation of unconditional average incomes of 
children in the sample differentiated by their parents’ union status and educational status. 
Overall, offspring of union parents earn higher incomes than offspring of non-union 
parents. This difference is more conspicuous for offspring of parents with lower education 
status. Among children whose parents did not graduate college, the average income of 
children with a union parent exceeds the average income of children with non-union 
parents by $6,300, or 16 percent, a difference that is significant at the 1 percent level. The 
educational attainment is also higher for offspring of union parents. The difference in the 
average health status between offspring of union and non-union parents is not statistically 
different from zero. For children who have at least one parent who has graduated college, 
parental union status had little effect on offspring income. This suggests that unions 
increase opportunity for children who need it most. 
 
The evidence that the offspring of union parents do better than the offspring of non-union 
parents raises the question of whether these differences reflect the impact of unionism on 
offspring outcomes or are the result of observed or unobserved attributes of union parents 
that give their children an advantage independent of parental union status. These methods 
do not allow for determination of the effect of unobserved attributes, but do allow for 
isolation of the union effect from observed attributes in the PSID survey. 
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To see whether the table 2 differences remain in the presence of other measures of 
parental attributes, the log of offspring income is regressed on the log of their parental 
income and other parental characteristics using the following form: 
 
(3)  LogYjk = β0 + β1Ukp + β2LogYkp + d∑ k Xkp +ε jk   
 
where j indexes offspring and k indexes their parents. Y is offspring’s labor income8; UP is 
their parents’ union status, where 1 indicates unionized and 0 non-union9; YP is parents’ 
family income and XP represents other parental attributes, such as parents’ age, race, and 
ethnicity, their full-time status, education, marital status, industry, and occupations, and 
the urban status of the household. If UP is significantly positive, on average the offspring 
of union parents earn higher income than the offspring of non-union parents. 
 
Table 3: Estimated relation between parents’ family income and union status on log 
(adult offspring income) 
 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Log (family 
income) 0.326*** 0.239***  0.224***  0.237*** 
 (0.074) (0.068)  (0.070)  (0.070) 
Union father   0.187*** 0.0164** 0.185*** 0.160** 
   (0.062) (0.064) (0.060) (0.061) 
Union mother   0.073 0.023 0.060 0.005 
   (0.087) (0.085) (0.085) (0.083) 
Union offspring     0.186*** 0.206*** 
     (0.059) (0.058) 
Other covariates No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
                                                          
8
 To measure the direct effect of parents’ unionism on offspring income,  offspring’s labor income is focused 
on rather than the combined family income of married couples. The use of labor income drops for offspring 
with self-employed status or those out of the labor force. 
9
 For parents’ union status, fathers and mothers are looked at separately. 
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State clustered SE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,068 1,068 1, 068 1, 068 1, 068 1, 068 
R-squared 0.066 0.188 0.179 0.193 0.186 0.201 
       
Note: Clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Child labor income is the 
labor income of individuals who were under age 12 in 1985, had at least one parent work full time in 
1985, and worked full time in 2011. Family income is the household income of the parents. Other 
covariates include parental age, education, full-time status, race, industry, occupation, marital status, and 
the household’s urban status. 
  
Table 3 gives the results of the regressions of log (offspring income) on parents’ attributes 
including parents’ family income.10 The coefficient on log (family income) in column 1 is 
the intergenerational income elasticity (IGE) that measures the association between 
parental income and offspring income. The estimated coefficient of 0.33 indicates that if 
parental income increases by 10 percent, offspring’s labor income increases by 3.3 percent 
for all persons in the sample.11 The addition of covariates for parental attributes reduces 
the coefficient to 0.24 in column 2.  
 
Column 3 of table 3 examines the effect of having union parents on offspring income 
absent family income but with inclusion of other parental covariates. The binary variable 
for union status of the father is significant and robust with a magnitude of 0.19, which 
implies that the adult offspring of unionized fathers earn 19 percent higher income than 
the adult offspring of non-unionized fathers. The binary variable for the union status of the 
mother is positive but insignificant.12  
 
Adding parental family income in column 4 reduces the coefficient on the union status of 
the father to 0.16, which is still statistically significant. This suggests that the effect of the 
father’s unionism goes beyond their higher income due to the union wage premium. 
Finally, in columns 5 and 6, a dummy variable is added indicating whether the offspring is 
                                                          
10
 The full results for all of the regression analyses are available upon request. Please contact hane@nber.org 
11
 Although labor income is used rather than family income of offspring to measure the IGE, this estimate is 
consistent with literature (Chetty et al. 2014; Lee and Solon 2006). Mazumder (2005) states that the 
estimated IGE could be subject to the attenuation bias if the data focus on short-term periods, because there 
could be a long-lasting transitory shock to income.  
12
 A binary variable is also used indicating if at least one of the parents is a union member (1 if the father or 
mother is union and 0 of both of them are non-union), and the coefficient is 0.15 and statistically significant 
at 1 percent of the significance level. 
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unionized. The estimated coefficients on father’s union status and parental income do not 
change much after the offspring’s union status is included, even though the estimated 
coefficient on offspring union status shows that offspring earn a substantial union 
premium. Compared to offspring whose fathers and themselves have no connection to 
unionism, offspring whose parents are unionized and themselves are also unionized earn 
about 36 percent (=16% +20%) higher labor income.13  
 
It is worth noting, however, that these union premia for offspring are not directly 
comparable to other union premia found in the literature since they are not controlled for 
the child’s attributes such as education, experience, industry, occupation, and other typical 
controls. Only the child’s union status is used as on the right side of the regression model 
to capture the “full effect” of parental union status on children’s income, as other controls 
of offspring could also reflect the indirect effect of unionism through children’s education, 
health, or occupation choice.  
  
                                                          
13
 The effect of parents’ unionism is analyzed controlling for separate labor incomes of household heads and 
their wives rather than controlling for parent’s family income, and similar results are obtained. 
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Table 4: Estimated relation between parents’ family income and union status  
on log (adult sons’ income) and log (adult daughters’ income) 
 Sons Daughters 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
Log(family income)  0.201  0.212*  0.265**  0.283*** 
  (0.129)  (0.126)  (0.106)  (0.104) 
Union father 0.142 0.125 0.133 0.115 0.219*** 0.181** 0.220*** 0.181** 
 (0.087) (0.087) (0.083) (0.083) (0.070) (0.072) (0.070) (0.071) 
Union mother -0.017 -0.054 -0.014 -0.053 0.240 0.162 0.219 0.130 
 (0.137) (0.137) (0.133) (0.132) (0.145) (0.137) (0.146) (0.141) 
Union offspring   0.247** 0.260**   0.133 0.173 
   (0.073) (0.074)   (0.112) (0.115) 
Other covariates YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
State clustered SE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 566 566 566 566 502 502 502 502 
R-squared 0.231 0.241 0.242 0.253 0.228 0.246 0.231 0.252 
         
Note: Clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 . Child labor income is the labor income of individuals who were 
under age 12 in 1985, had at least one parent working full time in 1985, and worked full time in 2011. Family income is the household income of the 
parents. Other covariates include parental age, education, full-time status, race, industry, occupation, marital status, and the household’s urban status.  
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The results in table 4 are obtained by disaggregating the analysis by gender of the 
offspring. The effects of log family income on log of offspring income are similar for 
sons and daughters, but the result is greater and more significant for daughters than for 
sons (the effect for sons is not statistically significant at the 90 percent level but this 
likely reflects the fact that the sample size has been cut by approximately half from table 
3). Fathers’ union status has a greater impact on daughters’ income than on sons’, but the 
sign of the union status is consistently positive across model specifications for sons.  
 
Table 5: The effect of parents’ unionism on education attainment and health status 
of offspring 
 
 Highest grade completed Health (1–5, 5=excellent) 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Union father 0.525** 0.492** 0.137* 0.131* 
 (0.225) (0.230) (0.076) (0.076) 
Union mother 0.271 0.196 0.162* 0.135 
 (0.309) (0.303) (0.083) (0.086) 
Log(family income)  0.357***  0.119* 
  (0.111)  (0.066) 
Other covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State clustered SE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,033 1,033 1,381 1,381 
R-squared 0.324 0.328 0.095 0.097 
     
Note: Clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Note: Cluster robust 
standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Education and health are for children 
who were below age 12 in 1985 and had a head of household working full time. Other covariates 
include parental age, full-time status, education, race, industry, occupation, marital status, and the 
household’s urban status. Education regressions are only for children who work full time. 
 
To what extent does the effect of parents’ unionism show up in other measures of 
socioeconomic well-being of offspring? This question is examined by estimating variants 
of equation (3) that replace offspring income with measures of education attainment and 
health, as reported by individuals on a 1 to 5 scale that is coded so that 5 = excellent 
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health and 1 = poor health status. In table 5, the results for the education measure show 
that for offspring having a union father, the highest grade completed even with the same 
family income (columns 1 and 2) substantially increases. Columns 3 and 4 of table 5 give 
the results for the health measure of offspring. The health status of offspring is positively 
associated with both father’s and mother’s union status. The results hold with the addition 
of family income. This may reflect health care and childcare benefits that unions provide 
to their members. Higher education attainment and better health status of offspring of 
union parents will also contribute to higher lifetime earnings of offspring.  
 
Given the many pathways by which educated and skilled workers pass on economic 
advantages to their children, it is important to determine whether the union parents’ effect 
on offspring income is stronger among more educated and skilled workers or among less 
educated and skilled workers. In the former case, the union effect would reduce relative 
mobility associated with education and skill while in the latter case the union effect 
would increase relative mobility. 
 
This issue is examined by dividing the sample into fathers with no college education and 
fathers with at least some college education and between fathers in blue-collar 
occupations compared to fathers in white-collar occupations. This educational cutoff is 
used because it maximizes sample size in the high- and low-skill groups. Equations (3) 
and (4) are then estimated for these groups. The results in table 6 show that the union 
effect in raising the income of offspring is concentrated among the children of fathers 
with less education and blue-collar jobs. While one potential explanation is the large 
union wage premium for low-skilled workers (Hirsch and Schumacher 1998), the 
inclusion of the father’s labor income variable, which should reflect the wage premium, 
still leaves a sizable independent union effect. 
 
 		
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The link between the rate of unionization in the geographic community in which young 
persons were raised and their future income, conditional on their parents’ 
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Table 6: Estimated effect of fathers’ unionism and income on log (offspring income), 
by parents’ education or occupational group 
 
 No college At least  
some college 
Blue collar White collar 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
Union father 0.275***  0.195**  0.107 0.104 0.213***  0.146**  0.067 0.067 
 (0.083) (0.088) (0.086) (0.085) (0.075) (0.069) (0.100) (0.100) 
Log (father labor income)  0.284***   0.059  0.293***   0.036 
  (0.066)  (0.097)  (0.069)  (0.122) 
Other covariates Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
State clustered SE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 435 435 479 478 498 497 416 416 
R-squared 0.234 0.263 0.059 0.06 0.194 0.23 0.047 0.047 
         
Note: Clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Child labor income is the labor income of individuals who were 
under age 12 in 1985, had a father who worked full time in 1985, and worked full time in 2011. Other covariates include the father’s age, race, 
industry, occupation, marital status, and the household’s urban status.
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income and the average income in their community is examined. To do this, the average 
2011–12 family incomes of a 1980–82 birth cohort is linked to the average 1996–2000 
family incomes of their parents by county and commuting zone from “Intergenerational 
Mobility Statistics and Selected Covariates by County” data provided by Chetty et al. 
(2014).14 This data is combined with union density data from Hirsch and McPherson’s 
Unionstats CPS-based estimates for metropolitan statistical areas. Matching the two data 
sets involves technical complications that are described in appendix C; summary statistics 
for this matched data are given in appendix D.15 
 
Aggregation of the parent-offspring relation in the second section of this paper should by 
itself produce a relationship between unionization of an area and future incomes of 
children raised in the area relative to their parents’ income. If children from unionized 
families earn higher incomes than children from otherwise comparable non-union 
families, aggregating the parental income during their formative years and the future 
incomes of children brought up in the area should yield higher incomes for children 
relative to parents in areas with higher union density. But the rate of unionization of an 
area may also affect the future incomes of all children in the area through potential union 
impacts on area resources (spillover effects of unionism). Unions generally advocate 
policies that benefit workers, such as raising minimum wages, increasing education 
spending, and improving public services, so that the effect of unionism may show up in 
                                                          
14
 The data by commuting zone and county is publicly available at www.Equality-of-Opportunity.org. 
15
 Most covariates come from the publicly available folder of Chetty et al. on www.Equality-Of-
Opporunity.org: population, percent of children with a single mother, commute time, high school dropout 
rates, college graduation rates, local tax and spending, the Gini coefficient, social capital, a state’s Earned 
Income Tax Credit coverage, and the progressivity of the state’s tax code. Single mother rates, dropout 
rates, and commute times were four of the “five factors” Chetty et al. found significant in their analysis. 
The Gini coefficient of just the bottom 99 percent is not included, because it is based on their non-public 
tax data and is not provided at the county level. Other covariates are added: first, industry, since some 
industries are more unionized than others, from data on industries in the Chetty et al. raw data folder from 
the 2000 Census: “Sex by Industry for the Employed Civilian Population 16 Years and Over.” The 
industries are placed into five categories. Second, multiple race variables are created. Using race data from 
the 2000 Census in the National Historical Geographic Information System (NHGIS) in the public data 
folder of Chetty et al., variables are created for the percentage of the MSA that is non-Hispanic black, non-
Hispanic Asian, non-Hispanic “other,” and Hispanic. Third, U.S. Census data is added from 2000 on the 
child poverty rate, average number of children per family, and median value of owner-occupied housing 
units. 
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higher incomes for all children from the area regardless of the union status of their 
parents.16  
 
As the area data contain no information on the individuals within the area, the two 
possible routes of impact cannot be distinguished. The analysis is limited to the overall 
relationship between the union density of a community and the future income of children 
who grow up in the community. 
 
Figure 3: The correlation between union density and mobility of offspring  
within commuting zones 
 
  
Note: Mobility for all offspring of an area is the residual from a regression of the log mean child 
income in an area on the log mean parent income of that area. The union density by commuting 
zone is from 1986 and the offspring income is from 2011–12 for the 1980–82 birth cohort.  
 
Figure 3 shows a scatter plot that depicts the correlation between union density of an area 
and the residual earnings from a regression of the log mean offspring income on the log 
                                                          
16
 Cox and Oaxaca (1982) find that states with higher union density have higher minimum wages. Gilens 
(2014) shows that unions are advocates for policies supported by the middle-income group. 
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mean parent income of that area. Since the residual captures the earnings that are not 
associated with parental income, it can measure the mobility of all offspring in an area. 
The figure presents the positive association between the unionization of a community and 
the future income of children brought up in that community, controlling for their parents’ 
incomes. The 2011–12 income (controlling for parents’ income) for the 1980–82 birth 
cohort is higher if they grew up in the commuting zones with higher union density.  
 
To estimate the magnitude of the effect of union density on the 2011–12 income of 
persons who had resided in that zone, the following model is used: 
 
(4) LogYi o = β0 + β1Uip + β2LogYi p + diXi∑ +εi  
 
where i indexes commuting zone (CZ), o indexes offspring, and p indexes their parents. 
Yi
pmeasures the average income of parents in the ith CZ over 1996-2000, and Yi
o
measures the average income of offspring in the same CZ. The union density figure is for 
1986, which is when the young persons would have been 4–6 years old. Because relative 
union density by area is a stable statistic, the results should be similar for union density 
over other time periods. To reduce the potential that the effect of unionism will be 
confounded with that of other area variables, the X vector in the regression controls for a 
large set of covariates, including many that could be channels for unionism to increase 
mobility such as, social capital, tax progressivity, the coverage of a state Earned Income 
Tax Credit (EITC), and lower child poverty, as listed in the note to table 7. 
 
Column 1 of table 7 gives the estimated coefficient on log of the mean parental income in 
CZ on the log of the mean of their offspring income with inclusion of various covariates. 
The coefficient shows that a 10 percent increase in a CZ’s average parents’  
income increases the average income of offspring in that CZ by 6.2 percent—a larger 
IGE than is found in the regressions for individuals, possibly due to lower measurement 
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error for area incomes or to neighborhood spillovers. 17 When union density is added to 
the column 2 regression, an area’s union density is indeed positively related to its 
intergenerational mobility. Column 3 puts the estimated union density effect to a 
stringent test by including dummy variables for each state. The coefficient on union 
density falls but still remains substantial—a 10 percent increase in union density is 
associated with a 2 percent increase in child income. The robustness of the results 
strongly suggests that the positive relationship between parents’ unionism and offspring 
income is more than a correlation.18  
 
Table 7: Estimated effect of area unionism on log (mean offspring income) 
 
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
        
Log (mean parents’ income) 0.617*** 0.547*** 0.582*** 
 (0.063) (0.079) (0.053) 
Union density, 1986  0.309*** 0.198*** 
  (0.127) (0.072) 
Other covariates YES YES YES 
State dummies    YES 
State clustered SE YES YES YES 
Observations 203 161 161 
R-squared 0.617 0.889 0.970 
    
Note: Clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Covariates include population size, race, percent of children with a single mother, 
commute time, occupational sector, high school dropout rates, child poverty rate, 
average number of children per family, median value of owner-occupied housing units, 
per capita local tax and spending, the Gini coefficient, social capital, whether the state 
has an Earned Income Tax Credit, and the progressivity of the state’s tax code. 
                                                          
17
 The coefficient on the parents’ income is similar to an IGE—a typical measure of immobility—but has a 
different interpretation since an IGE based on individual income and this elasticity is based on the mean 
income of individuals within an area. Hence, there is a single elasticity for each CZ. 
18
 As a robustness check, an analysis is performed of the effects of areas’ union density on mobility within 
that area using the “absolute upward mobility (AM)” measure used in Chetty et al. The expected income 
ranking of children whose parents are at the 25th percentile of the national income distribution is higher if 
the children grew up in a community with higher union density (see appendix E for a detailed description 
and the result of this analysis). Although the AM focuses on disadvantaged children, the result is consistent 
with the findings in table 7. 
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In sum, the area data, which was derived from a different data source than the PSID, tell a 
similar story about the positive association of unionism to the income progress of young 
persons. The data also show that unionism is highly correlated with the well-being of all 
children in an area, not just children of union parents. While the data do not allow for 
decomposition of the area effects into those due to more young people growing up in 
union homes or larger spillover effects, the similarity of the estimated union effects 
provides some assurance that the results are not the artifact of a particular kind of data or 
modeling exercise. 
 
  	
 
The evidence in this paper shows that parents’ unionism has a significant relationship 
with their offspring’s well-being. The adult offspring of unionized parents earn higher 
labor income compared to the offspring of non-unionized parents. The offspring of 
unionized parents also attain higher levels of education and better health status. The 
intergenerational union premium is stronger for less educated/skilled parents than for 
more educated/skilled parents. The evidence also suggests that there may be spillover 
effects of unionism. Relative to their parents, the children of an area with high union 
density are better off. 
 
These findings suggest a strong relationship exists between unions, mobility, and the 
middle class. Proving causality, however, is difficult without experimental or quasi-
experimental data, which have become the gold standard in modern empirical economics. 
But these findings hopefully will trigger further research into whether a causal 
relationship between unions and intergenerational mobility exists. 
 
If there is a causal component to the strong correlations found, the natural implication is 
that the United States will find it harder to address the problem of the diminishing 
middle-income group than if trade unions were as strong and viable as they were 30, 40, 
or 50 years ago. A strong union movement is not simply sufficient for high levels of 
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intergenerational mobility and middle-class membership, but it could be necessary. If that 
is the case, it will be difficult to meaningfully increase intergenerational mobility and 
rebuild the middle class without also rebuilding unions or some comparable worker-
based organizations. 
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Appendix A: Summary statistics from the PSID 1985 and 2011 files 
 
Variables N Mean SD Min Max 
            
Family income (parent) 1,084 $36,120 $19,505 $2,952 $126,800 
Wife labor income (parent) 971 $6,549 $8,043 0 $60,000 
HH labor income (parent) 1,084 $26,646 $16,671 0 $115,000 
White household head 
(parent)  1,084 0.858 0.349 0 1 
Black household head 
(parent) 1,084 0.098 0.297 0 1 
American Indian household 
head (parent) 1,084 0.004 0.060 0 1 
Asian household head 
(parent) 1,084 0.004 0.064 0 1 
Hispanic household head 
(parent) 1,084 0.030 0.169 0 1 
Married household head 
(parent) 1,084 0.902 0.297 0 1 
Never married household 
head (parent) 1,084 0.039 0.193 0 1 
Widowed household head 
(parent) 1,084 0.005 0.074 0 1 
Divorce household head 
(parent) 1,084 0.040 0.196 0 1 
Separated household head 
(parent) 1,084 0.013 0.115 0 1 
High school graduate 
household head (parent) 1,084 0.795 0.404 0 1 
College graduate household 
head (parent) 1,084 0.195 0.397 0 1 
High school graduate wife 
(parent) 971 0.914 0.281 0 1 
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College graduate wife 
(parent) 971 0.340 0.474 0 1 
Household head works full 
time (parent) 1,084 0.952 0.215 0 1 
Wife works full time 
(parent) 971 0.330 0.470 0 1 
Union household head 
(parent) 1,084 0.214 0.410 0 1 
Union wife (parent) 971 0.078 0.268 0 1 
Blue collar father (parent) 1,084 0.460 0.499 0 1 
White collar father (parent) 1,084 0.524 0.500 0 1 
Child grades completed  1,084 14.68 1.986 0 17 
Child works full time 1,084 1 0 1 1 
Child health (1-5, 1 is 
excellent) 1,084 3.87 .836 1 5 
Child rural upbringing 1,084 0.086 0.281 0 1 
Child urban upbringing 1,084 0.250 0.433 0 1 
Child suburban upbringing 1,084 0.436 0.496 0 1 
Child other upbringing 1,084 0.029 0.169 0 1 
Child labor income 1,084 $46,311 $29,391 0 $225,000 
Child family income  1,084 $72,586 $60,984 $3,600 $1,553,500 
Child union status 1,084 0.131 0.338 0 1 
Child age 1,084 31.06 3.38 25 37 
Note: “Child” statistics represent the characteristics of individuals who were under age 12 in 1985, had at 
least one parent work full time in 1985, and worked full time in 2011. “Parent” statistics represent 
characteristics of their parents. 
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Appendix B: Issues in linking commuting zone data from “intergenerational 
mobility statistics and selected covariates by county” and unionization data from 
Unionstats.org 
  
There are problems in linking the geographic area incomes from the tax data and the 
geographic union densities from the Unionstats.org data. The average parent and 
offspring income data relate to counties and commuting zones (CZ), which are 
themselves collections of counties. The union data are available on the metropolitan 
statistical area (MSA) level, which are also collections of counties (except in New 
England, as described below). The geographic analysis takes place on the CZ level. The 
primary advantage of CZs over MSAs is that the CZ file of Chetty et al. comes with 
state IDs, which allows for use of standard errors clustered at the state level to control 
for geographic and state-specific correlations. Both CZs and MSAs often cross state 
boundaries (the Washington, DC MSA and CZ cover the District of Columbia, 
Maryland, and Virginia), but the MSAs do not have state IDs and thus state clustered 
standard errors cannot be used. Each county is assigned the union density of the MSA to 
which it belongs and these estimates are combined into CZs, dropping counties that are 
not part of MSAs since there is no union data for them. The correlation between the 
mobility estimates of the limited CZs and the whole CZs is .94, leading to the belief that 
this is not a serious problem. Additionally, the covariates are constructed so that they 
only include counties for which there is union data. 
 
Another problem in forming this mobility/unionization area data set is that the 
unionization data for the New England states differs from that for the rest of the country. 
Instead of MSAs (which are collections of entire counties), they are New England City 
and Town Areas (NECTAs), which are collections of towns. Thus, counties can belong 
to multiple MSAs. Fairfield County, Connecticut, for example, belongs to the Danbury, 
Stamford-Norwalk, and Bridgeport NECTAs. To deal with this problem, the average is 
taken of the union densities of the NECTAs to which each county belongs from 
UnionStats.com, weighted by the portion of their 2000 population that lived in each 
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NECTA.19 For Fairfield County, Connecticut, for example, the union densities of 
Danbury (17.5 percent), Stamford-Norwalk (10.7 percent), and Bridgeport (15.9 
percent) are averaged weighted by each of their 2000 populations (183,303, 353,556, 
and 345,708 respectively). This produces an estimated union density of 14.15 percent 
for Fairfield County. These county-level union estimates are then merged with county-
level income estimates and other covariates, and collapsedinto CZs based on counties.  
 
Finally, because there is no union data outside of MSAs, the analysis does not apply to 
rural areas. The total population of the CZs in 2000 was 207 million compared to a U.S. 
population in 2000 of 282 million. While it may make sense to treat rural areas 
differently than MSAs, there is no way to obtain unionization rates for rural areas to see 
whether the results do or do not hold for them. 
                                                          
19
 The Union Membership and Coverage Database is an Internet data resource providing private and 
public sector labor union membership, coverage, and density estimates compiled from the monthly 
household Current Population Survey. See www.unionstats.com.  
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Appendix C: Summary statistics from the regional data from 
federal income tax data 
 
Variables N Mean SD Min Max 
            
Union density, 1986 203 0.156 0.078 0.025 0.407 
Primary sector 203 0.015 0.019 0.001 0.123 
Secondary sector 203 0.214 0.063 0.084 0.462 
Tertiary sector 203 0.595 0.451 0.449 0.720 
Quartenary sector 203 0.077 0.027 0.027 0.200 
Quinary sector 203 0.051 0.026 0.022 0.194 
Other sector  214 0.049 0.005 0.038 0.068 
Percent black 203 0.122 0.107 0.003 0.468 
Percent Hispanic 203 0.085 0.125 0.005 0.869 
Percent Asian 203 0.024 0.039 0.002 0.453 
Percent white 203 0.746 0.157 0.119 0.977 
Percent other race 203 0.023 0.023 0.004 0.258 
Gini coefficient 203 0.445 0.066 0.248 0.630 
Children per family 203 2.054 0.112 1.826 2.600 
Average parents income 203 $84,487 $18,219 $41,711 $149,210 
Average child income 203 $46,458 $5,997 $32,100 $64,121 
Percent with commute <15 
minutes 203 0.314 0.071 0.151 0.508 
Single mother families 203 0.227 0.039 0.094 0.355 
Social capital 201 -.252 1.006 -2.723 2.397 
Dropout rate 163 0.048 0.021 0.011 0.155 
Median house value 203 $114,108 $48,573 $52,622 $407,865 
Child poverty rate 203 15.52 5.066 5.300 41.244 
EITC exposure 203 1.166 3.439 0 21.33 
Tax progressivity 203 .988 1.849 0 7.220 
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Appendix D: Union density and intergenerational mobility for children whose parents were at the 
25th percentile of the national income distribution 
 
Chetty et al. (2014) emphasize a different concept of intergenerational mobility focusing 
on individual’s rankings in the national income distribution. The preferred measure in 
their paper, which they call “absolute upward mobility (AM),” is the expected rank of 
the 2011–12 income of a child whose parents’ 1996–2000 incomes are at the 25th 
percentile of their national income distribution. They find that there is a substantial 
variation in the AM across the United States. 
 
As a robustness check, the AM is also utilized as an additional measure for 
intergenerational mobility. Appendix  E displays the results from the regressions of AM 
on union density and other characteristics of CZs. Column 1 shows a strong correlation 
between AM and union density by CZs. The coefficient implies that a 10 percentage-
point increase in 1986 union density is associated with a 1.3 percentile increase in the 
expected income ranking of adult offspring who were born in a household at the 25th 
percentile income distribution, regardless of the union status of parents. Thus, the 
coefficient may also be picking up some of the spillover effect of unionization within the 
region. Although most union workers will be ranked higher than the 25th percentile, 
unions generally support raising minimum wages and other policies that increase 
mobility. Thus, children from disadvantageous family backgrounds may be able to move 
up the income ladder more in terms of ranking if they grew up in areas with higher 
union density than in areas with lower union density. 
 
To assess the relative strength of this correlation between the AM and the union density, 
it is compared to the correlation between AM and the five factors that Chetty et al. found 
to have the strongest relationship with AM:  
1. the percent of children with single mothers as parents,  
2. the income-adjusted dropout rate,  
3. the level of social capital,  
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4. the percent of workers with commutes under 15 minutes (a measure of 
segregation), and  
5. inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient.20  
All covariates and the AM are normalized for better comparison. Columns 2 through 7 
show that the correlation between mobility and union density is about the same 
magnitude as the correlation between mobility and dropout rates, social capital, or 
segregation. Columns 8 and 9 report the coefficients from the multilevel regression of 
the AM on union density and the other covariates. In column 8, even after controlling 
for all five factors, the union density still shows a significantly positive association with 
the AM. Column 9 is controlled for several other covariates—race, industry, median 
housing value, the number of children per family, tax progressivity, the existence of a 
state EITC, and the number of children below the poverty line—in additional to the five 
factors, and union density still remains significant.
                                                          
20
 Chetty et al.(2014) find a Gini coefficient of just the bottom 99 percent of households has a stronger 
negative association with mobility than an overall Gini does. The overall Gini is used, however, because 
they do not provide a bottom 99 percent Gini by county and it comes from their federal tax data so public 
data could not be used. 
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Appendix E: The correlation between “absolute upward mobility (AM)” and union density within CZs 
 
 AM AM_norm AM_norm AM_norm AM_norm AM_norm AM_norm AM_norm AM_norm 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
          
1986 Union 
Density 
12.90***         
(4.579)         
1986 Union 
Density_norm 
 0.333***      0.386*** 0.259*** 
 (0.118)      (0.131) (0.097) 
Dropout 
Rate_norm 
  -0.274     -0.050 -0.130** 
  (0.110)     (0.088) (0.52) 
Social 
Capital_norm 
   0.270**    0.444 -0.030 
   (0.132)    (0.084) (0.072) 
Single 
Mothers_norm 
    -0.625***   -0.576*** -0.166 
    (0.061)   (0.078) (0.115) 
Commute time 
<15 min_norm 
     0.255***  0.214** 0.196** 
     (0.090)  (0.090) (0.070) 
Gini Coefficient 
Overall_norm 
      -0.367*** 0.123** -0.119 
      (0.112) (0.113) (0.078) 
Other covariates         YES 
State clustered SE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 203 203 163 201 214 203 203 161 161 
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R-squared 0.111 0.111 0.070 0.073 0.392 0.065 0.135 0.54 0.783 
          
Note: Clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All variables are normalized, except for the first column. Other 
covariates include race, industry, median housing value, the number of children per family, tax progressivity, the existence of a state EITC, and the 
fraction of children below the poverty line within MSA. 
